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State Sovereign Immunity, as Recognized and
Extended Through the Eleventh Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States, Bars
Administrative Commissions From Adjudicating
Private Complaints Against a State Agency That
Has Not Consented to Being Subject to Such
Proceedings: Federal Maritime Commission v. South
Carolina State Ports Authority et al.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - ELEVENTH AMENDMENT - STATE
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY - ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS - The Su-
preme Court of the United States held that state sovereign immu-
nity, as understood and extended through the Eleventh Amend-
ment of the Constitution of the United States, bars the Federal
Maritime Commission, and similar administrative bodies, from
adjudicating private complaints against state agencies without
their consent.
Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Au-
thority et al., 535 U.S. 743 (2002)
South Carolina Maritime Services, Inc. ("Maritime Services")
operates a cruise ship called the MIV Tropic Sea.! On five sepa-
rate occasions, Maritime Services asked the South Carolina State
Ports Authority ("SCSPA") for permission to berth the MI V cruise
ship at the SCSPA's port facilities in Charleston, South Carolina.2
The SCSPA continually denied Maritime Services' requests, con-
tending that it had an established policy of denying berthing space
to vessels whose primary purpose was to carry on gambling activi-
ties.'
Pursuant to 46 U.S.C. app. § 1710(a), Maritime Services filed a
complaint with the Federal Maritime Commission ("FMC") alleg-
1. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. Ports Auth. et al., 535 U.S. 743 (2002).
2. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 747. Maritime Services intended to offer cruises on
the MIV Tropic Sea that would depart from the Port of Charleston. Id. Some of these trips
would travel in international waters while others would remain in United States territory,
and all of these trips would permit passengers to participate in gambling activities on
board. Id.
3. Id. Berth is defined as a place where a ship lies when at anchor or at a wharf.
WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 145 (9th ed. 1986).
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ing that the SCSPA's refusal to provide berthing space to the M1 V
Tropic Sea violated the Shipping Act.4 Maritime Service's com-
plaint alleged that the SCSPA had implemented its antigambling
policy in a discriminatory fashion.' Maritime services complained
that the SCSPA had "unduly and unreasonably preferred" Carni-
val Cruise Lines over Maritime Services in violation of 46 U.S.C.
app. § 1709(d)(4) and further, that the SCSPA unreasonably re-
fused to do business with Maritime Services in violation of §
1709(b)(10). 6 Finally, Maritime Services alleged that the SCSPA's
violations had inflicted a "loss of profits, loss of earnings, loss of
sales, and loss of business opportunities. 7
To remedy the aforementioned injuries, Maritime Services
prayed that the FMC take three actions.8 First, Maritime Services
asked the FMC to seek a preliminary injunction in the United
States District Court for the District of South Carolina to prevent
the SCSPA from continuing to discriminate in its berthing prac-
tices.9 Second, Maritime Services asked the FMC -to direct the
SCSPA to pay reparations, interest, and attorneys' fees related to
the complaint. '° Finally, Maritime Services requested that the
FMC issue an order commanding the SCSPA to cease and desist
from violating the Shipping Act and award Maritime Services any
other relief the FMC deemed "just and proper.""
Pursuant to the FMC Rules of Practice and Procedure, Maritime
Services' complaint was referred to an administrative law judge
4. Id. at 748. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1710(a) (2003) provides that "any person may file with
the Commission a sworn complaint alleging a violation of this chapter...and may seek repa-
ration for any injury caused to the complainant by that violation." 46 U.S.C. app. § 1710(a)
(2003). The Shipping Act of 1984 forbids, among other things, marine terminal operators
from discriminating against terminal users. The Act gives the FMC full authority to en-
force the statute. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 748.
5. Id. Maritime Services specifically pointed out that the SCSPA's was acting in a
"discriminatory" manner by allowing two Carnival Cruise Line vessels to berth in Charles-
ton even though Carnival offered gambling on both of the aforementioned ships. Id.
6. Id. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1709(d)(4) (2003) provides that "no marine terminal operator
may give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage or impose any undue or un-
reasonable prejudice or disadvantage with respect to any person." 46 U.S.C. app. §
1709(d)(4) (2003). § 1709(b)(10) blocks a common carrier from "unreasonably refus[ing] to
deal or negotiate." 46 U.S.C. app. § 1709(b)(10) (2003).
7. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 748.
8. Id.
9. Id. A preliminary injunction is defined as a temporary injunction issued before or
during a trial to prevent an irreparable injury from occurring before the court has a chance
to decide the case. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 629 (Abridged 7th ed. 2000).
10. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 748-49.
11. Id. at 749.
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(",JA ) 12  The SCSPA then filed an answer, maintaining that it
had adhered to its antigambling policy in a nondiscriminatory
manner.1 3 In addition, the SCSPA filed a motion to dismiss in
which it asserted that the SCSPA, as an arm of the state of South
Carolina, was "entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity" from
Maritime Services' suit.4
The ALJ agreed with the SCSPA's arguments, and concluded
that recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States,
regarding the Eleventh Amendment and State sovereign immu-
nity from private suits, require that the complaint be dismissed. 5
The ALJ did note, however, that the FMC could still act to inves-
tigate Maritime Services' allegations in an independent investiga-
tion. 6 Maritime Services did not appeal the ALJ's dismissal of its
complaint, but the FMC independently decided to review the
ALJ's ruling to consider whether state sovereign immunity from
private suits extended to proceedings before the FMC.'7
The SCSPA filed a petition for review of the FMC's reversal of
the ALJ's ruling, and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit reversed. After carefully reviewing the "precise
nature" of the procedures employed by the FMC for resolving
complaints, such as the one filed by Maritime Services, the court
of appeals concluded that the administrative proceedings were "an
adjudication" specifically precluded by sovereign immunity. 9
Upon the court of appeals' reversal of the FMC ruling, the FMC
12. Id. This practice is authorized by 46 C.F.R. § 502.223 (2003). Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. The SCSPA rested it argument on the notion that this portion of the Constitu-
tion prohibits any statute that would authorize the FMC to sue the State of South Carolina
for damages and injunctive relief. Id.
15. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 749. The ALJ based his decision primarily on the
holding in Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), in which the Supreme
Court held that Congress, pursuant to its Article I powers, could not abrogate state sover-
eign immunity by mere statute. Id. at 44.
16. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 750.
17. Id. Ultimately, the FMC concluded that the AL's determination was in error, and
as such, the FMC reversed the ALJ's decision dismissing Maritime Services' complaint. Id.
18. Id. The Court of Appeals primarily relied on the Constitution's prohibition of suits
between private parties and unconsenting states and ultimately concluded that an admin-
istrative agency is bound by this prohibition just as a state or federal court would be.
South Carolina State Ports Authority et al. v Federal Maritime Commission, 243 F.3d 165,
173 (4th Cir. 2001).
19. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 750-51. In making this determination, the Court of
Appeals noted the SCSPA's status as an "arm of the State of South Carolina." Id.
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petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for certiorari,
which was granted."
The primary issue, which the Supreme Court of the United
States ultimately addressed in this appeal, focused on "whether
the sovereign immunity enjoyed by States as part of the Constitu-
tional framework applies to [administrative] adjudications [such
as those] conducted by the FMC."2' The Supreme Court ultimately
answered this question in the affirmative, holding that the "inter-
est in protecting States' dignity and the strong similarities be-
tween FMC proceedings and civil litigation... state sovereign im-
munity bars the FMC from adjudicating complaints filed by a pri-
vate party against a nonconsenting state."22 Practically speaking,
this holding effectively bars an administrative agency like the
FMC from bringing a "private suit" against a state agency like the
SCSPA.
23
The Court began its analysis by examining the history behind
the dual sovereignty of the federal and state branches of govern-
ment.24 Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, traced the con-
stitutional underpinnings of the notion of state sovereign immu-
nity from the Constitutional Convention until the ratification of
the Eleventh Amendment.25 Justice Thomas ultimately concluded
that the Eleventh Amendment was not a definition of the scope of
state sovereign immunity, but rather, it was but one example of
the early endorsement of state sovereign immunity against pri-
vate suits.26
The next part of the majority's analysis of this issue focused in
on the case at bar: whether State sovereign immunity applied to
adjudications such as those conducted by the FMC.27 At this point,
Justice Thomas noted that the Supreme Court has historically
20. Id. at 751. The Supreme Court of the United States granted FMC's petition for
certiorari at 534 U.S. 971 (2001). Id.
21. Id. at 753. The Supreme Court is primarily focusing on the Eleventh Amendment.
Id.
22. Id. at 760. Justice Thomas delivered the [majority] opinion of the Court, in which
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kenndy joined. Id. at 747.
23. Id. at 760-61.
24. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 751.
25. Id. at 751-52. Justice Thomas made a point to stress that constitutional framers,
such as Alexander Hamilton, stressed the importance of state sovereignty. Id.
26. Id. at 753. See also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991); Blatchford v. Native
Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991).
27. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 753. The United States government argued that
that the Court of Appeals erred because the Eleventh Amendment only referred to re-
straints on "judicial power," and inter alia, the FMC was not a judiciary body, but rather
only an administrative arm of the Executive branch. Id.
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extended State Sovereign immunity to various other types of pro-
ceedings, including private suits pursuant to federal causes of ac-
tion, suits by foreign nations, and suits by federal corporations.28
Ultimately, the majority's conclusion is that any interpretation of
the types of actions barred by the Eleventh Amendment should be
construed broadly.29
Justice Thomas acknowledged the fact that there was little his-
tory to guide the Court's decision because administrative adjudica-
tions were not a reality at the time the framers drafted the Consti-
tution." In Hans v. Louisiana", the Court held that the Constitu-
tion was not intended to raise any proceedings against states that
were "unheard of' when the Constitution was drafted.2  At this
point, the majority applied the Hans presumption to the type of
adjudication in the case at bar, and ultimately concluded that "the
similarities between FMC proceedings and civil litigation are
overwhelming."33
From this analysis, the majority, through Justice Thomas, con-
cluded that the "preeminent purpose of state sovereign immunity
is to accord States the dignity that is consistent with their status
as sovereign entities."34 Thus, the Court held that the importance
of this "dignity" and the fact that FMC proceedings were so simi-
lar to civil litigation barred such proceedings as violating state
sovereign immunity.35 The remainder of the majority's opinion
addresses various arguments posed by the United States (arguing
on FMC's behalf), and accordingly, strikes each of these assertions
down.36 Thus, the majority affirmed the judgment of the court of
28. Id. at 754. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 775;
Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934). Id.
29. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 754. Justice Thomas pointed out this notion in a
direct response to Justice Breyer's "literalist" interpretation. Id.
30. Id. at 755.
31. 134 U.S. 1 (1890)
32. Id. at 756. See also Hans, 134 U.S. 1. Justice Thomas briefly traced the history of
administrative adjudications and concluded that the earliest example the United States
(arguing on FMC's behalf) could find was a case in 1918. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at
756.
33. Id. at 759. Thomas considered various factors in coming to this conclusion, includ-
ing, but not limited to, the similarity between ALJs and Article III (judiciary) judges, the
common features between administrative adjudications and judicial proceedings, and the
similarity in rules and procedures adhered to by FMC proceedings. Id. at 755-59.
34. Id. at 760.
35. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 760-61.
36. Id. at 762-68. These arguments primarily focused on the distinctions between FMC
(administrative) adjudications and civil litigation, including, but not limited to, the limited
power of an FMC order, the type of relief that can be granted, and even a limited Com-
merce Clause argument. Id. The Court highlighted these distinctions, but ultimately con-
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appeals barring the FMC proceedings pursuant to state sovereign
immunity.37
Two dissenting opinions were filed in this 5-4 Supreme Court
decision.38 Justice Stevens' dissent focused on two areas where he
believed the majority's opinion was faulty: (1) the Court's decision
in Alden v. Maine" and (2) the majority's discussion of state "dig-
nity."4" First, Justice Stevens asserted that the dissent in cases
like Alden highlighted the difference between private suits in civil
litigation and administrative adjudications such as those con-
ducted by the FMC.4' Finally, Stevens concluded that the Court's
extension of the States "dignity rationale" unreasonably interfered
with federal administrative proceedings.42
In regards to the first part of his dissent, Justice Stevens dis-
cussed how the creation of the Eleventh Amendment was in direct
response to the Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia.43 Within
this discussion, Justice Stevens deviated from the majority's in-
terpretation of legislative history and Eleventh Amendment inter-
pretation in that he concluded that the framers were only con-
cerned with subject matter jurisdiction, and not the loftier objec-
tive of preserving state "dignity."' Stevens' dissent turns on the
belief that the majority affords too much weight to its "dignity"
analysis in finding that sovereign immunity extends to adminis-
trative adjudications.45
Justice Breyer's dissent focused on concerns not highlighted by
the Stevens dissent. First, Justice Breyer concluded that adminis-
cluded that such differences did not change the notion that FMC proceedings threatened
the "balance of power embodied in our Constitution." Id. at 769.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 770-88. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at 770-72 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stevens, Souter,
and Ginsburg, joined. Id. at 772-88 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
39. 527 U.S. at 706.
40. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 770 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens traced
the constitutional development of the Eleventh Amendment, and concluded it was passed to
protect states from judicial "subject-matter jurisdiction." Id. at 771.
41. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 772 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens looked
at holdings, such as those in Alden, 527 U.S. 706, and concluded even the majority in those
cases did not contemplate sovereign immunity as applied by the majority in the case at bar.
Id.
42. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 770 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793). In
Chisholm, the Court held that it had personal jurisdiction over the state defendant and
subject-matter jurisdiction over the case. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 771 (discussing
Chisholm).
44. Id. at 771-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 771 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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trative proceedings, such as those conducted by the FMC, are
clearly out of the reach of sovereign immunity in that these pro-
ceedings are an Executive branch power and they are authorized
by Congress for the administration of disputes in particular ar-
eas." This dissent concludes that "[t]he upshot is that this case
involves a typical Executive Branch agency exercising Executive
Branch powers seeking to determine whether a particular person
has violated federal law." 7
Next, Breyer dissected various points the majority made in its
argument." Justice Breyer's dissent concluded that the majority's
decision unduly threatened the Executive and Legislative
Branches of government, and that states' "dignity" would not be
infringed by allowing federal administrative agencies to settle dis-
putes.49
Throughout his dissent, Justice Breyer focused on the various
constitutional arguments, or lack of arguments rather, for holding
that state sovereign immunity bars proceedings such as those as-
signed to the FMC. His initial analysis focused on the FMC as an
"independent" federal agency. Instead of focusing on states'
rights, Justice Breyer couched his analysis in the constitutionality
of Congress' power to delegate "rulemaking" and "adjudicative
powers" to agencies."' Justice Breyer extended this focus into an
argument that would place Executive Branch functions specifi-
cally outside of the scope of the Eleventh Amendment.52 Ulti-
mately, Justice Breyer stated that the FMC is merely choosing to
evaluate complaints through an adjudicative process, but Con-
gress authorizes this process through its delegation of authority to
agencies like the FMC.53
46. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 772-73 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer went
into a discussion of administrative adjudications in general, including the fact that such
proceedings are referred to as "quasi legislative" or quasi adjudicative." Id.
47. Id. at 776.(Breyer, J., dissenting). Breyer opined that the majority should not pe-
nalize the FMC for merely "choosing" an ALJ as the means for determining whether a
violation of the Shipping Act has occurred. Id.
48. Id. at 777-88 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The bulk of Breyer's dissent focused in on the
Eleventh Amendment's explicit reference to "judicial power." Id.
49. Id. at 786-87 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer pointed out that he has consis-
tently dis'sented where the Court has allowed loose interpretation "that restricts far too
severely the authority of the Federal government." Id.
50. Id. at 773 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
51. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 772-73 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See I.C.C. v. Cin-
cinnati, N.O. & T.P.R. Co., 167 U.S. 479 (1897); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
52. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 773 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 773-74 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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The next segment of Justice Breyer's constitutional analysis
deals with looking at, and debunking, the use of either the Tenth
or Eleventh Amendments in application of sovereign immunity
against the FMC in the instant case.54 Justice Breyer looks at the
majority's rationale and ultimately argues that Justice Thomas'
lofty States' "dignity" theory does not withstand scrutiny, and it
leaves the relations between the federal and state governments on
lofty grounds." The remainder of this dissenting opinion focuses
on pointing out what the dissent views as a weak historical back-
ground for holding that sovereign immunity bars the FMC's ac-
tions in the case at bar.56
Early in the history of our nation, one of the framers of the Con-
stitution, Alexander Hamilton, noted the importance of allowing
states to maintain sovereign immunity from suits brought by pri-
vate individuals as a way to safeguard the states as separate enti-
ties from the federal branch of government.57 This idea was
quickly threatened though when the Supreme Court put the no-
tion of state sovereign immunity in limbo with its controversial
decision in Chisholm v. Georgia.58
In Chisholm, individual citizens of South Carolina brought an
action against the state of Georgia.59 The plaintiffs in this case
argued that an order should be entered against Georgia if it failed
to appear in court. ° The Chisholm court ultimately let the action
stand, and in doing so, held that individual citizens of one state
may sue another state to recover money judgments.61
Essentially, the court in Chisholm, after examining relevant
portions of Article 3, Section 2 of the Constitution, came to three
very important conclusions.62 The first point, which the Chisholm
court drew from the general words of Article 3, is that it gave the
54. Id. at 774-77 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The Eleventh Amendment bars any judicial
proceeding against a state by a private individual, and the Tenth Amendment reserves
rights to the states not delegated to the federal government. Id.
55. Id. at 776-78 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 783-88 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer closed his dissent by highlight-
ing his fear that the Court's decision would prove "randomly destructive" in regards to
relations between the federal government, states, and the individual citizen. Id.
57. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 752 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 487-88
(James Madison). (C. Rossiter ed., 1961).).
58. Id. at 752 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
59. Chisholm, 2 U.S. 419.
60. Id. at 429. Justice Iredell delivered the opinion of the majority. Id.
61. Id. at 449-50. Justice Iredell indicated he had some reservations about the deci-
sion, but ultimately the law as it stood at the time required such a result. Id.
62. Id. at 431. The relevant portions of this part of the Constitution pertain to the
judicial powers granted to the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Supreme Court exclusive jurisdiction in every civil controversy
that arose between two or more states, among the several states,
and any actions against ambassadors or officers of the United
States.63 Further, the majority in this case determined that the
wording of Article 3 was such as to give the Supreme Court origi-
nal jurisdiction in every civil controversy arising between a state
and citizens of other states and between a state and foreign citi-
zens.64 Ultimately, the Chisholm majority upheld actions against
states by citizens of other states solely because the Constitution
did not prohibit it, and despite the Court's reservations, in consid-
erations of common law notions of sovereign immunity, about do-
ing so."
The Chisholm decision sent shockwaves through the nation, and
Congress immediately passed the Eleventh Amendment to over-
turn the result in Chisholm.66 The Eleventh Amendment stated
quite plainly that "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend any suit in law or equity, commenced
or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of an-
other State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."67
Rather than fully capture the concept of sovereign immunity as it
pertains to states' rights, Congress chose only to address those
concerns raised by the decision in Chisholm.68 As such, the Elev-
enth Amendment has been seen as only providing one example of
the possible scope of states' sovereign immunity. 9
Since the passage of the Eleventh Amendment, the Court has
taken a different view of state sovereign immunity than it had in
Chisholm. In Ex Parte Ayers,7" citizens of Virginia brought suit
against the state's attorney general and several county attorneys
to enjoin said officials from collecting taxes on certain bonds pur-
suant to a statute passed by the Virginia Legislature.7 A lower
federal court enjoined these state officials from collecting the taxes
in dispute, and when the attorney general refused to follow the
63. Id. at 431.
64. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 431-32.
65. Id. at 449-50. The majority made numerous indications that the Attorney General
of the United States supported allowing such suits to stand, and in effect, doing away with
sovereign immunity. Id.
66. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 752-53.
67. Id. (quoting the Eleventh Amendment).
68. Id. at 753 (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706).
69. Id. (quoting Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775).
70. 123 U.S. 443 (1887).
71. Ayers, 123 U.S. at 493.
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order, he and his subordinates were jailed. 2 Ultimately, the Ayers
court held that the order was null and void as it was the result of
a suit against officials of a state acting in their official capacity. 3
As such, the attorney general and the various county attorneys
were shielded from suit by sovereign immunity. 4
In coming to this conclusion, the Court relied primarily on the
assertion that the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution se-
cures to the state immunity from suit by individual citizens of
other states or aliens. 5 The majority opinion went on to explain
that "[t]he very object and purpose of the 11th amendment were to
prevent the indignity of subjecting a state to the coercive process
of judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties."76 The Ayers
Court acknowledged that the literal text of the Eleventh Amend-
ment had been interpreted by the Court to extend to officers of a
state acting in their official capacity.7 From this notion, the Court
analyzed the case at bar and concluded that the actions of the At-
torney General of Virginia and the various county attorneys were
actions in official state capacity, and therefore, these individuals
were shielded from suit by state sovereign immunity."
This initial expansion of the Eleventh Amendment in regards to
who was protected by state sovereign immunity progressed
through the years to encompass various types of "suits" covered by
this protection." A prominent case in the Court's recognition and
arguable expansion of sovereign immunity came in the 1890 case
of Hans v. State of Louisiana.°
In Hans, a citizen of Louisiana brought suit against the state of
Louisiana to recover certain amounts allegedly owed to him on
certain coupons under the state's control.81 Petitioner, Hans, ar-
gued that the Eleventh Amendment only applied to suits brought
72. Id. at 493-94.
73. Id. at 503-04. Justice Matthews delivered the majority opinion of the court.
74. Id. at 507-08. The majority concluded that the action was brought essentially
against the state of Virginia, as the act of collecting taxes were done pursuant to a state
statute. Id.
75. Ayers, 123 U.S. at 505-06.
76. Id. at 505.
77. Id. at 487-88 (quoting Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270).
78. Id. at 507-08 (Field, J., concurring). Justice Field filed a concurring opinion. Id.
79. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 753-54.
80. 134 U.S. 1.
81. Id. at 9. Justice Bradley delivered the majority opinion of the Court. Id. Justice
Harlan filed a concurring opinion. Id.
82. Id. at 9-10.
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by foreign citizens and citizens of another State. 2 The Hans Court
ultimately held that the Eleventh Amendment extended to suits
brought by citizens of the states being sued.83
In coming to this conclusion, Justice Bradley, writing for the
majority, began with the recognition that numerous cases since
the passage of the Eleventh Amendment clearly prohibited citi-
zens of other states from bringing suit against a state.4 From this
starting point, Justice Bradley went on to harshly criticize the
Court's holding in Chisholm v. Georgia, and to finally conclude
that the Eleventh Amendment should be taken beyond its literal
text and applied where the Court deems appropriate and just.85
This opinion established the presumption that the Constitution
was not intended to "raise up" any proceedings against the States
that were "anomalous and unheard of when the Constitution was
adopted."86 As such, the Court in Hans concluded that the spirit of
the Eleventh Amendment disallowed Hans, a citizen of Louisiana,
from bringing a suit against the state of Louisiana.
In re State of New York,8 the Supreme Court was once again
faced with an issue of choosing whether or not to expand the
breadth of state sovereign immunity as rooted in the Eleventh
Amendment. 9 In this case, citizens of New York filed suit against
the state to recover damages allegedly caused to their boats while
in New York waters." The New York Court held state sovereign
immunity, as set out in the Eleventh Amendment, shielded the
state from liability in admiralty proceedings.9'
The first part of the Court's analysis in this case focused on the
fundamental protection of state sovereign immunity extended to
the states through passage of the Eleventh Amendment.92 From
this starting point, Justice Pitney, writing for the majority, dis-
83. Id.
84. Id. at 10 (citing Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711 (1882); Hagood v. Southern, 117
U.S. 52 (1886); and Ex Parte Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887)).
85. Hans, 134 U.S. at 11-13. Justice Bradley pointed out that Justice Iredell was the
only justice to state any reservations about the Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia. Id.
86. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 755 (quoting Hans, 134 U.S. at 18).
87. Hans, 134 U.S. at 9-10.
88. In re State of New York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921).
89. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 754 (discussing New York, 256 U.S. at 490).
90. New York, 256 U.S. at 494-95.
91. Id. at 497. The suit was brought specifically against the superintendent of the New
York Department of Public Works, and the Court ultimately determined it was a suit
against him in his official capacity as an agent of the state. Id.
92. Id. at 497.
93. Hans, 134 U.S. at 1.
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cussed how cases like Hans v. Louisiana93 stood for the proposition
that the Eleventh Amendment would be expanded from its literal
text to cover any proceedings deemed as "suits" by the Court.
9 4
The majority opinion concluded this analysis stating, "it seems to
us equally clear that it [the Eleventh Amendment] cannot with
propriety be construed to leave open for a suit against a State in
the admiralty jurisdiction by individuals, whether its own citizens
or not."95
This seeming extension of the doctrine of state sovereign immu-
nity continued in the Supreme Court's 1934 decision in Principal-
ity of Monaco v. State of Mississippi.96 In this case, the Principal-
ity of Monaco sought leave to bring suit against the State of Mis-
sissippi in regards to bonds issued by the state that were allegedly
the sole property of Monaco.97 The Monaco Court denied this re-
lief, and in doing so, held that the Eleventh Amendment protec-
tion of sovereign immunity should be imputed to cover actions
brought by foreign states/entities."
The unanimous opinion in this case focused on looking at past
cases that upheld sovereign immunity despite the fact that such
suits were not specifically prohibited by the literal text of the
Eleventh Amendment.99 The Monaco Court rested its holding on
the Supreme Court's manifested precedent that established that
any sovereign immunity analysis cannot rest on a mere literal ap-
plication of the Eleventh Amendment.' 0 Applying this presump-
tion to the case at bar, the Court concluded that state sovereign
immunity extended to shield states from suits brought by foreign
states/countries.'°'
In more modern Supreme Court cases, the Court has been apt to
discuss the centrality of state sovereignty as the very essence of
the founding of the United States."2 In Gregory v. Ashcroft,'°3a
Missouri state judge sued the Governor of Missouri to challenge
94. New York, 256 U.S. at 497-98.
95. Id. at 498.
96. 292 U.S. 313. Chief Justice Hughes wrote the unanimous opinion of the Court. Id.
97. Id. at 317.
98. Id. at 331-32.
99. Id. at 322 (citing Hans, 134 U.S. 1; Duhne v. New Jersey, 251 U.S. 311 (1920); and
Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 (1900)).
100. Id. at 322.
101. Principality of Monaco, 292 U.S. at 331-32.
102. See Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 755.
103. 501 U.S. 452 (1991). Justice O'Connor delivered the majority opinion of the Court.
Id.
104. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 455-56.
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the mandatory retirement provision as it was set out in Missouri's
Constitution."°4 Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, held
that the case should be dismissed because it pertained to a power
reserved to the sovereign states.0 5 Although this case did not spe-
cifically turn on an issue of sovereign immunity, it goes into great
detail to discuss the importance of separating the federal govern-
ment from the state government to maintain our country's "dual
sovereignty."' 6
The Supreme Court extended this discussion, and more point-
edly referred to the importance of the notion of state sovereign
immunity in Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak.0 7  In this
case, residents of Alaskan Native villages brought an action
against the State's Commissioner of Community and Regional Af-
fairs, specifically challenging his implementation of the state's
revenue-sharing statute.0 8 Justice Scalia's opinion concluded that
the suit was barred by the Eleventh Amendment's shield of state
sovereign immunity.' 9 In effect, this decision expanded sovereign
immunity to shield states from actions brought by an Indian
tribe." ' Throughout the majority's analysis in Blatchford"', the
Court relied on the theme of state sovereign immunity as being
integral to the very framework of our country's government.
112
Scalia's analysis ended with a blanket conclusion of the Supreme
Court's general mindset since its decision in Hans v. Louisiana, 
"
3
"that the States entered the federal system with their sovereignty
intact" and "that the judicial authority in Article III is limited by
this sovereignty."". Thus, Scalia's opinion sees this theme as jus-
tification for the expansion and upholding of state sovereign im-
munity beyond the bounds of the literal text of the Eleventh
Amendment."'
105. Id.
106. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 452 (discussed in Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 751).
107. 501 U.S. 775 (1991). Justice Scalia delivered the majority opinion of the Court.
108. Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 777-78.
109. Id. at 787-88 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting opin-
ion. Id.
110. Id. at 785-86 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
111. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 751-52 (quoting Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 775).
112. Hans, 134 U.S. at 1.
113. Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 779.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 779-81.
116. 527 U.S. 706 (1999). Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. Id.
117. Alden, 527 U.S. at 711-12. The Fair Labor Standards Act is a federal statute. 29
U.S.C. §201 et seq. (1994).
807Summer 2003
Duquesne Law Review
In 1999, the Supreme Court solidified the continued vitality and
expansion of sovereign immunity in Alden v. Maine.116 In Alden, a
group of state probation officers brought an action against the
State of Maine for alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards
Acts ("FLSA"). 7 The Supreme Court, through Justice Kennedy,
dismissed the action, holding Congress could not subject a state to
suit by statute without the state's express or implied consent.118
In coming to the above holding, the majority went through an
extensive and detailed examination of state sovereign immunity
and Eleventh Amendment interpretations therein.119 The first
relevant point the Alden majority established was that state sov-
ereign immunity is neither derived from, nor limited by, the literal
text of the Eleventh Amendment. 2 ° Next, the opinion stressed
that state sovereign immunity is a fundamental aspect of the sov-
ereign identity that states had even prior to the inception of the
Constitution. 2' Justice Kennedy's analysis then highlighted the
majority's belief that the federal system was established by the
Constitution with the specific objective of preserving state sover-
eignty.122 This portion of the Court's opinion then came to the con-
clusion that the Constitution was drafted, even before the inclu-
sion of the Eleventh Amendment, with the idea that the states
"are not relegated to the role of mere provinces or political corpo-
rations, but retain the dignity, though not full authority, of sover-
eignty."23 Based on these various assertions and understandings
of the Constitution, before and after the Eleventh Amendment, the
Alden Court came to the conclusion that Congress does not have
the power through the FLSA to compel non-consenting states to
face private suits."4
Keeping the aforementioned history in mind, the Court's hold-
ing in Federal Maritime Commission appears to be a logical exten-
sion of the Court's continued expansion of Eleventh Amendment
118. Alden, 527 U.S. at 712.
119. Id. at 720-757.
120. Id. at 713.
121. Id. at 713-714.
122. Alden, 527 U.S. at 714 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 39, p. 245 (James Madison).
(C. Rossiter ed., 1961).).
123. Id. at 715. The majority opinion indicates that exceptions to immunity apply where
states expressly or impliedly consent to suit being brought against them. Id.
124. Id. at 712.
125. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 760-65.
126. Id. at 770-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Id. at 772-88 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 768-69.
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protection since Congress' enactment of the Eleventh Amendment.
Throughout the vast history of Eleventh Amendment considera-
tions, the majority of the Supreme Court continues to recognize
that the Eleventh Amendment is only a starting point, rather than
an ending point, for protecting the integrity of the states. By bar-
ring private individuals from bringing suit through a federal ad-
ministrative agency, the majority further solidifies the sovereign
immunity reserved to the states to preserve their collective status
as s separate entity from the federal government.
The Court's opinion in Federal Maritime Commission should not
be construed as overreaching the intent of the Eleventh Amend-
ment. The majority, through Justice Thomas, makes it clear that
the ultimate determinant factor in the Court's decision is that it
considers the Federal Maritime Commission's administrative pro-
ceeding as being a "suit" barred by state sovereign immunity. 125 It
is important to note that the dissenting opinions never disagree
with the majority's view of expanding the Eleventh Amendment
beyond its literal text, but rather, the dissents focus on arguing
the proceedings, overseen by the Federal Maritime Commission,
should not be classified as the type of "suit" state sovereign im-
munity would bar.'26
From the decision in this case, it is clear that state sovereign
immunity will continue to be an important shield raised to protect
states from suits by private individuals. Federal Maritime Com-
mission 27 extends this protection to situations where private indi-
viduals seek redress through federal administrative agencies.
Only time, and future court decisions, will tell how this will affect
other government agencies. One thing is certain: the current ma-
jority on the Supreme Court of the United States clearly puts dual
sovereignty above any administrative concerns. As long as the
proceeding is considered a "suit" by the majority, it would seem
states can successfully invoke sovereign immunity, as recognized
and extended through the Eleventh Amendment.
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